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18 April 1957

TENTATIVE OUTLINE OF BRIEFING
ON
IMPORTANCE OF UNCLASSIFIED STRATEGIC INFORMATION

- I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT (Roughly 10 minutes)
- A. Historical account of CIA's participation in this problem.
 - B. Summary of over-all availabilities and limitations of US and Soviet open-source materials. (Recent changes in availability as compared to several years ago; and statistical information on present "take" of both sides.)
 - C. Contrast of differences in US and Soviet limitations of open-source materials.
 - 1. Present pre-publication limitation arrangements (including reasons for greater Soviet limitation--both for internal security reasons and because of basically different Soviet institutional arrangements).
 - 2. Present procedures for making available (exchanging) publications.
 - D. Extent to which each uses open-source materials on the other. (Bring out the insights into "closed" fields which can be obtained by systematic putting together of indications in "open" sources.)
 - 1. Value to US primarily for intelligence purposes (give examples, such as, analysis of Moscow telephone directory)--since Soviet science and technology generally not in advance of US--except in few cases (give examples, such as, welding techniques, ceramics, etc.).
 - 2. Value to Soviet primarily to assist their technical development.
 - a. Evidence of widespread Soviet use of US technical materials. (Examples, such as manufacturers catalogs, house organs, [REDACTED] etc.)
 - b. Soviet intelligence needs on US industrial development--in general--generally met by unconcealable open sources.

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- c. Soviet intelligence needs for strategic and military purposes more dependent on disclosures and "leaks" of classified information and on covert approaches, than on unclassified industrial materials possible of concealment.

II. DETAILED PRESENTATIONS (About 30 minutes)

- A. Area-by-area statements (i.e., industrial economics, scientific and geographic--roughly 10 minutes each) of principal Soviet technical weaknesses likely to be benefited by US open-source materials.
 1. General statement--including explanation of practical difficulties in denial, particularly once material has been published.
 2. Key examples--particularly where at least partial denial might be possible.
 3. Additional Soviet intelligence benefits from US open-source material--with key examples.
- B. Detailed statement of US needs for Soviet open-source material for intelligence purposes.
 1. General statement as to use by US intelligence and possible means of increasing access.
 2. Key examples of particular needs and suggestions for meeting.
 3. Additional US technical needs for Soviet published materials and suggestions for obtaining.
- C. Probable gains possible, and corresponding costs (for each of the three separate fields).
 1. In attempting greater denial of open-source materials.
 2. In attempting to maximize US access to Soviet open-source materials.

(NOTE: Care should be taken to avoid making direct recommendations or direct evaluation of over-all net advantage or disadvantage.)

III. RECAPITULATION (About 5 minutes)

A brief summary statement of what is probably accomplishable--if desired--and of most appropriate means, and probable costs.

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